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Abstract 
A rapidly growing body of research examines the ways in which climatic variability influence 
economic and societal outcomes. This study investigates how weather shocks triggered social 
distress in British colonial Africa. Further, it intervenes in a long-standing and unsettled debate  
concerning the effects of agricultural commercialization on the abilities of rural communities to 
cope with exogenous shocks. We collect qualitative evidence from annual administrative records 
to explore the mechanisms linking weather extremes to harvest failures and social distress. We 
also conduct econometric testing on a novel panel dataset of 143 administrative districts across 
west, south-central and east Africa in the Interwar Era (1920-1939). Our  findings are twofold. 
First, we find robust evidence that rainfall anomalies (both drought and excessive precipitation) 
are associated with spikes in imprisonment (our proxy for social distress). We argue that the key 
causal pathway is the loss of agricultural income, which results in higher imprisonment for theft, 
unrest, debt and tax default. Second, we find that the impact of weather shocks on distress is 
partially mitigated by the cultivation of export crops. Our findings suggest that, even in the 
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British colonial context, smallholder export crop cultivation led to higher private incomes as well 
as greater public investment. Our findings speak to a topic of considerable urgency today as the 
process of global climate change accelerates, generating more severe and unpredictable climatic 
extremes. An increased understanding and identification of adaptive and mitigating factors, 
would  assist in  targeting policy interventions and designing adaptive institutions to support 
vulnerable rural societies. 
Keywords: Africa; weather shocks; economic history; climate vulnerability; food crisis; 
agricultural commercialization 
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1. Introduction  
For centuries, thinkers and scholars have sought to understand whether and how climatic 
conditions influence societies and the economy. A better understanding of this causal link 
promises insights into why some economies have thrived historically while others languished, 
how contemporary societies can design effective policies and institutions to shield against 
current climate extremes, and how future climate change may impact human society. In recent 
years, a proliferation of rigorous studies has emerged, aiming to quantify and assess the effects 
of climate extremes on economic and social outcomes (Hsiang et al., 2003; Dell et al., 2014). 
This surge can be explained partly by rising public concerns about climate change and its 
potentially ensuing distortive effects on human development; partly by greater popular 
awareness of the critical role that climate might play in affecting social and economic outcomes; 
and partly by methodological advances and data availability, aided by improvements in 
computing power.  
The adverse impact of climatic variability on social outcomes has proven particularly 
pronounced in developing regions, with Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth abbreviated to Africa) 
being the most vulnerable one. This does not come as a surprise, as a large share of the 
population depends on rain-fed subsistence agriculture, with less than 5% of the cultivated area 
being irrigated (FAO 2014). In such a context, climate-induced harvest failures can easily spill 
over into food insecurity, economic distress and social destabilization. Africa’s rising population 
densities, pervasive climate change and resurging socio-political instability make this continued 
vulnerability to the vagaries of climate a most pressing concern (Morton, 2007).  
While climate extremes have an undoubted and significant impact on societies, human 
affairs are not uniformly determined by climate. Instead, the effects of climate are mediated by a 
wide variety of geographical, cultural, institutional and commercial factors (Sen, 1981; 
Thompson, 1971; Watts & Bohle, 1993). The key question, then, is which factors enable the 
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mitigation of adverse impacts of climate extremes, and how such factors can be propagated 
through targeted policy interventions (Adger, 2000; Folke, 2006; Gallopin, 2006).  
Whether agricultural commercialization aggravates or mitigates the vulnerability of rural 
communities is the subject of a multifaceted, heated and long-standing debate among historians, 
policy makers and social scientists (Von Braun & Kennedy, 1994; Govereh & Jayne, 2003). This 
study aims to use Africa’s past experience with smallholder-based export production during the 
colonial era to generate new insights on the impact of agricultural commercialization on the 
abilities of rural communities to cope with weather shocks. We provide new district-level 
evidence on the link between weather shocks and social tension and distress in British colonial 
Africa during the interwar era (1920-1939), as well as on the mediating role of smallholder-
based export crop production. 
The data for our analysis have been compiled from annual Colonial Blue Books and 
Administration Reports, stored in The National Archives of the UK in London. Data was 
collected for over 200 sub-national administrative units in Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (see figure 1).
1
 Exploiting the 
extensive and consistent administrative records that remain from Britain’s African empire, we 
are able to provide new material on a world region for which systematic data collection is 
notoriously difficult, and, as a consequence, also expand the historical time horizon.  
  
                                                 
1
 Not all of these districts included sufficient data to end up in our final analysis. Our baseline results include 143 
districts. For Nigeria and Zambia, we use provinces instead of districts, as data was not consistently reported below 
the province level (see Papaioannou 2016).  
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Figure 1. Countries included in this study, with internal administrative borders, ca. 1930 
 
Notes: See main text. 
Our research strategy has both a qualitative and econometric component. First, we 
critically examine the colonial administrative records to improve our understanding of the 
mechanisms that explain the impact of drought and excessive rainfall on harvest outcomes and 
distress. Second, we econometrically test the link between weather shocks and social distress, as 
well as the mediating impact of export crop cultivation. To that end, we obtain observations on 
annual rainfall and imprisonment, and construct a novel panel dataset at the sub-national level. 
We also construct two indicators to measure each district’s involvement in export crop 
cultivation. To measure social distress, we use annual fluctuations in imprisonment at the district 
level. While colonial prisons locked people up for a wide range of distress-related behaviours, 
such as debt, tax and fine default, petty thefts and civil disobedience (Bernault, 2007; Hynd, 
2011), imprisonment spikes in years of weather shocks provide us with a particularly valuable 
inroad to capture social distress.  
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We justify the setting of our analysis in interwar British colonial Africa on a number of 
grounds. First, Britain administered a vast African empire. The extensive bureaucratic legacy has 
allowed us to construct a consistent district-level dataset spanning approximately one-fifth of 
Africa’s landmass and one-third of its population in this period. Second, the geographic and 
temporal scope provides data for over 200 sub-national administrative units. In some of these 
units, crops were grown on a considerable scale for export, while in others agricultural 
production was primarily geared towards subsistence. Our temporal scope encompasses the 
interwar period, a period of relative calm between the violent early-colonial conquest and the 
highly politicized post-war road to independence (Killingray, 1986).  
Our qualitative evidence suggests several different mechanisms through which both 
drought and excessive rainfall result in harvest failures, adversely affecting agricultural incomes 
and provoking distress. The econometric estimates for our full sample, using fixed-effects 
models, confirm this relationship and reveal a robust U-shaped impact of weather shocks on 
different measures of imprisonment. The effect is not symmetrical. A ‘negative rainfall shock’ 
(drought), measured as a one standard deviation decrease from the long-term rainfall mean, is 
associated with 16.0 standard deviation increase in total imprisonment, and a ‘positive rainfall 
shock’ (excessive rainfall), measured as a one standard deviation increase from the long-term 
rainfall mean, is associated with an even stronger 24.8 standard deviation increase in total 
imprisonment. These effects are similar in magnitude to accumulated evidence from other 
studies reviewed by Hsiang et al. (2013). The results are robust to using two different indicators 
of annual rainfall anomaly, as well as range of alternative formulas for parameterizing rainfall 
shocks.  
Having established a robust overall relationship between rainfall anomalies and annual 
spikes in imprisonment for our full dataset, we test if this relationship is mediated by 
smallholder-based export crop cultivation. Our results show that a one standard deviation change 
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in rainfall (in either direction) is associated with 10.2 standard deviation change in total 
imprisonment in districts with substantial export crop production, as compared to 33.9 standard 
deviation change in districts with negligible or no export crop production. This finding suggests 
that imprisonment spikes in districts with relatively high amounts of export crop income per 
capita were significantly less affected by weather shocks. We argue that this finding indicates 
that commercialization of smallholder agriculture did have a mitigating effect on rural 
communities’ vulnerability to weather shocks. The fact that our findings pass a wide range of 
robustness tests, increases our confidence in the actual production of export crops playing a 
crucial role in mitigating the impact of weather shocks.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 places our study in the 
context of several related literatures. Section 3 introduces our qualitative evidence on the link 
between climate extremes, loss of agricultural income and distress. Section 4 discusses the data 
for our econometric analysis. Section 5 econometrically demonstrates a causal link between 
rainfall and imprisonment. Section 6 econometrically demonstrates that export crops mitigates 
the effect found in Section 5. Section 7 discusses the implications of our findings and concludes.  
2. Related Literature 
2.1 The impact of climate on economy and society 
Over the past decade, scholars and policy makers have become increasingly aware of the 
short-run and long-run impact of climatic factors on a wide range of economic, social and 
political outcomes. The goal of this sub-section is to provide a brief overview of the most 
important links between climatic fluctuations and societal outcomes suggested in the literature. 
For a more extensive and profound summary on the new climate-economy literature, we 
encourage readers to consult Dell et al. (2014) for a general discussion, Burke et al. (2014) for 
conflict outcomes, Deschenes (2014) for health outcomes, Auffhammer et al. (2013) for climatic 
modelling, and Hsiang (2016) for nuances on climate econometrics.  
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While some scholars dispute the evidence linking weather to conflict outcomes (Klomp 
& Bulte, 2013; Buhaug et al., 2014), a range of studies have found that climatic variability not 
only triggers conflict (Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Papaioannou 
2016), crime (Iyer & Topalova, 2014; Blakeslee & Fishman, 2015; Papaioannou, 2017), and full-
blown civil war (Blattman & Miguel, 2010), but also processes of democratization (Brückner & 
Ciccone, 2011). Scholars are divided on the mechanisms that explain the ‘climate-society nexus’ 
(Almer & Boes, 2012; Buhaug, 2010), but harvest failures are found to be a prime candidate, 
especially in settings where people’s incomes rely heavily on rain-fed farming and where small 
fluctuations in crop yields can have devastating effects on livelihoods (Barrios et al., 2010; Iyer 
& Topalova, 2014; Blakeslee & Fishman, 2015; Brückner & Ciccone, 2011; Miguel et al., 2004; 
Schlenker & Lobell, 2010; Papaioannou, 2017).  
Recent contributions have begun to investigate different time periods (Papaioannou, 
2016; Jia, 2014), employ a more fine-grained, sub-national scope (Harari et al., 2013; Raleigh & 
Urdal, 2007) and use more non-binary indicators as the dependent variable (Papaioannou, 2016; 
2017). Moreover, a number of studies have employed detailed case study analyses to uncover the 
key mechanisms leading from weather variability to social distress, civil unrest and political 
upheaval (Adano et al., 2012, Benjaminsen et al., 2012; Ember et al., 2012; Witsenburg & 
Adano, 2009). Among those who take precipitation as the key independent variable, some find 
that drought is the prime reason for societal destabilization (Couttenier & Soubeyran, 2011; 
Maystadt & Ecker, 2014), while others argue that both droughts and excessive rainfall fuel 
higher social tension (Papaioannou, 2016; Papaioannou, 2017; Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012; 
Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012).  
The effects of climate extremes on local societies are not uniform nor predetermined, but 
instead mediated by geographical, cultural, institutional, commercial factors (Sen, 1981; Watts & 
Bohle, 1993; Papaioannou & Frankema, 2017). In the words of E.P. Thompson, social unrest 
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should not be seen as a mere “spasmodic” response to adverse conditions, and “a bad harvest, or 
a down-turn in trade” are not in themselves sufficient explanations of social outcomes 
(Thompson, 1971). The key question, then, is which factors mitigate the impact of weather 
shocks, and how such factors can be propagated through targeted policy interventions. The 
mitigation of vulnerability to climate extremes has been a key priority issue in recent literatures 
investigating sustainable rural livelihoods (Chambers & Conway, 1992; Ellis, 2000; Scoones, 
2009) and adaptive strategies to cope with climatic variability and change (Adger, 2000; Folke, 
2006; Gallopin, 2006; Ahmed et al., 2009).  
Our contribution here is fourfold. Firstly, we use qualitative evidence to explore the 
mechanisms running from weather shocks to social distress. Second, our dependent variable 
(imprisonment) is continuous and fine-grained, and allows us to pick up relatively minor 
fluctuations in social distress in the wake of these shocks. Third, we provide new data on a 
historical period that is so far understudied. Fourthly, and most importantly, we econometrically 
test for the mitigating effect of agricultural commercialization on vulnerability to weather 
shocks. 
 
2.2. Agricultural commercialization and weather shocks in a colonial context 
It seems obvious that agricultural production systems play a particularly crucial part in 
determining societies’ abilities to cope with exogenous shocks. However, the ways in which 
agriculture may enhance the resilience of African communities, in a context of erratic and 
changing weather conditions, has been a particularly contentious issue among scholars and 
policy makers (Bryceson, 2002; Collier & Dercon, 2014; Giller et al. 2009; Raikes & Gibbon, 
2000; Papaioannou & Frankema, 2017). The empirical evidence on the impact of agricultural 
commercialization on resilience to weather shocks is mixed. On the positive side, increased 
openness to external markets has been associated (a) with higher incomes, and (b) with farmers’ 
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improved abilities to ‘smooth consumption’ and diminish short-term risks (Burgess & 
Donaldson, 2010; Fafchamps, 2003; Myint, 1958; Von Braun & Kennedy, 1994). Agricultural 
commercialization has also been argued to provide rural communities with access to new crops, 
inputs and agricultural technologies and to incentivize governments to invest in infrastructure, 
famine prevention and extension services, each with the potential to alleviate feasible adverse 
effects of volatile climatic conditions (Goetz, 1993; Govereh & Jayne, 2003; Maxwell & 
Fernando, 1989; Tosh, 1978; Von Braun & Kennedy, 1994). At the same time, scholars have 
drawn ample attention to the fact that market access  is not a uniform blessing to vulnerable rural 
communities. When attention is diverted from subsistence production, production for markets 
may induce hunger and malnutrition, while commercialization may result in the erosion of 
‘traditional insurance mechanisms’, induce stratification, subject farmers to volatile markets, and 
facilitate external exploitation and extraction, each of which in fact makes societies more 
vulnerable to weather-induced shocks (Bates, 1981; Scott, 1976; Vaughan, 1987; Von Braun & 
Kennedy, 1994; Watts, 1983).  
The literature has exposed numerous and sometimes conflicting parallel mechanisms that 
influence the effect of export-based agricultural commercialization on distress in the wake of 
weather shocks. We do not claim to test the validity of the individual mechanisms proposed on 
either side. Instead, we take a previously underexplored angle and methodology and empirically 
test the ‘weighted’ or ‘net’ outcome of the variegated mechanisms running from export crop 
cultivation to vulnerability to weather shocks. In statistical terms, we tease out an ‘average’ or 
‘overall treatment effect’ of export crops on types of distress that resulted in imprisonment in 
interwar British colonial Africa.  
While we argue that our findings have broader implications and are relevant for 
contemporary debates on agricultural commercialization, it is also important to acknowledge the 
particularities of the context from which our results are drawn. The volume of agricultural 
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exports expanded markedly during the era of colonial rule (~1880-1960) (Frankema et al., 2015). 
In many cases, colonial rulers attempted to introduce or expand export crops through coercion 
and exploitation. In some countries, such as Kenya or Zimbabwe, settlers expropriated land and 
barred African smallholders from producing the most profitable crops (Mosley, 1983). In others, 
such as Mali, Congo or Mozambique, rural communities were forced to cultivate and sell crops 
for export rather than subsistence (Isaacman, 1996; Roberts, 1996; Likaka, 1997). However, 
uniformly equating the ‘export crop revolutions’ in early twentieth century Africa with colonial 
exploitation would not do justice to the agency and initiative of African smallholders (Tosh, 
1980; Austin, 2014a). The expansion of cocoa production in Ghana and Nigeria was driven by 
African rural capitalists (Hill, 1997), while the expansion of commercial groundnut production in 
the Gambia and Northern Nigeria, as well as the introduction of tobacco and cotton in Uganda, 
Tanzania and Malawi, were conditional on the productive choices of millions of African rural 
households (Bryceson, 1990; Hogendorn, 1978; Mandala, 1990, Swindell & Jeng 2006; Wrigley, 
1959). In northern Nigeria, smallholders massively took up groundnut farming, while British 
colonial interests preferred to see cotton exported (Hogendorn, 1978). The cultivation of cotton 
in Uganda and groundnuts in the Gambia were primarily driven by indigenous agents, and their 
cultivation attracted scores of migrants from across the colonial borders (Swindell & Jeng, 2006; 
De Haas, 2017). 
A number of characteristics were common to the great majority of export crop cultivating 
smallholders during the colonial era. Firstly, they were cultivating in a land abundant context in 
which labour was the primary factor constraining further expansion (Tosh, 1980; Austin, 2008). 
Secondly, farmers continued to cultivate food crops and to pursue food self-sufficiency (Tosh, 
1980). A typical cotton growing household in eastern Uganda, for example, only devoted 2.5 out 
of its total 8.0 acres cropped annually to cotton, and the remainder to food crops such as millet 
and groundnuts, primarily for home consumption (De Haas, 2016). Cocoa farmers in Nigeria and 
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Ghana were, perhaps, the exception to this rule, due to the high profitability of cocoa, although 
even they cultivated considerable amounts of food crops alongside their cash crop (Austin, 
2014b). Thirdly, export crops were cultivated with basic technology (hand cultivation, few 
external inputs and mostly unimproved seeds) (Tosh, 1980). As a result, yields were typically 
modest, but at the same time, smallholders did not have to incur large debts in order to 
participate in export crop cultivation. In some cases, export crops were explicitly ‘state 
sponsored’, and inputs such as cotton seeds or coffee seedlings were freely distributed.  
While the introduction and expansion of export crops in British colonial Africa may not 
have exclusively or even primarily been driven by colonial policies, smallholders’ productive 
choices were undoubtedly shaped by colonial occupation. Even though households were not 
formally obliged to cultivate crops in most cases, they were often pressurized to do so by chiefs 
and local administrators, or subjected to  indirect force by the required payment of colonial taxes 
to market their produce (Bryceson, 1990; Mandala 1990; Wrigley 1959). Therefore, colonial 
state interventions may well have prevented some of the potential gains of agricultural 
commercialization from accruing to rural producers themselves.  
Colonial rule also affected the spatial distribution of agricultural commercialization. In 
some areas, the introduction of motorized transport and new agricultural technologies under 
colonial rule may have enhanced the productive capacities of rural producers, while in others, it 
is possible that the lack of investment and the introduction of taxes spurred rural impoverishment 
and outmigration of young men, contributing to a deepening of regional inequalities.  It is well 
conceivable that without colonialism, these districts would have benefited even more from 
agricultural commercialization, or that districts that ended up as marginalized subsistence 
economies during the colonial era would have fared better if colonial states had made more 
efforts to increase their access to external markets.  
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Our finding that regions growing export crops are more resilient to weather shocks, begs 
(rather than answers) further questions about the interfering role of colonialism. For now, we 
simply face the reality that there is no empirical counterfactual at hand to answer such questions 
(Heldring & Robinson, 2012). 
 
3. Qualitative evidence  
3.1. Weather shocks, harvest failures and social distress  
Our sources provide a unique opportunity to engage with debates over the effects of 
weather anomalies on rural African societies. The British colonizers set up a hierarchically 
organized system of administration in their African dependencies. Territories were subdivided 
into provinces and districts. The maintenance of law and order was largely left to African 
policemen, prison guards and native authorities, who operated as ‘indirect rulers’ under the 
supervision of British administrative officers. Elaborate administration accounts were kept, and 
local officials reported on a regular basis to their supervisors on a range of issues. We use annual 
administrative reports obtained from the Departments of Agriculture, Native Affairs, Police, 
Justice and Prisons. These reports are consistent in their coverage of issues over time and across 
colonies, giving us a uniquely comprehensive insight into local conditions across a wide area and 
a timespan of 20 years.  
The reports are rich in relevant content. At the same time, we must be aware of the 
colonial context in which they were produced. British colonial services were understaffed, and 
local administrators’ accounts reveal strong prejudice and paternalistic and derogatory attitudes 
towards local populations. On top of that, previous scholars have pointed out that civil servants, 
in order to inflate their achievements and benefit their own careers, had an incentive to focus on 
‘progress’ and paint a rosy picture to superiors, which may compromise some of the reliability of 
local administrative accounts (Killingray, 1986). We read the reports critically, and argue that 
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some statements in them can be more readily accepted than others. For example, an agricultural 
officer describing the impact of drought on seed germination seems to us more unproblematic 
than a district commissioner attributing starvation to “the apathy of an ease loving people” 
(Sierra Leone 1923), or an episode of social unrest to the “idleness and nomadic instinct” of the 
groups involved (Kenya, 1933).  
The impact of weather conditions on agricultural outcomes is extensively discussed by 
colonial administrators, who make regular note of weather-induced agricultural failure, resulting 
in higher levels of distress. Both too little and too much rainfall are routinely proffered as causes 
of depressed agricultural incomes.  
Droughts are frequently mentioned as a catalyst for suppressed yields. In severe cases, 
drought is also associated with complete crop failure, dust storms and soil erosion. For instance, 
the agricultural report of 1920 Gold Coast states that the food crops in Volta River “were 
exceedingly scarce” as “the drought during the early part of the year is causing many of the crops 
to fail and all crops realised high prices” (Gold Coast, Agricultural Report 1920). Similarly, in 
1927, the commissioner of Zaria District (Northern Nigeria) noted that the “considerable 
decrease [in foodstuffs] is accounted for by a drought which occurred after planting had taken 
place” which made it “impossible for peasants to cultivate their land” (Nigeria, Provincial 
Report 1927).  
Diminished water supplies to wells, surface water sources and pastures, also associated 
with lack of rainfall, negatively impacts upon livestock. To prevent starvation, people moved 
with their livestock, which in turn increased their susceptibility to disease and further weakened  
underfed herds. An administrative account discusses how these varied drought effects 
simultaneously struck Baringo District (Kenya): “The year 1933 has been one of the worst in 
living memory. A complete failure of the long rains caused enormous losses among stock, ruined 
World Development  Papaioannou & de Haas 
16 
the crops in the low-lying parts and made the harvest on Masop very late. It is safe to say 50 per 
cent of the cattle died” (Kenya, Native Affairs 1933).  
 Regular mention is also made of the adverse effects of excessive rainfall on agriculture. 
These effects run via different mechanisms. Heavy precipitation and resulting floods damaged 
crops and created unfavourable conditions for harvesting, storage and transportation of 
agricultural produce. In 1936, the Rufiji District (Tanzania) suffered “a great flood”, which 
“destroyed the main crops of one-third of the population” (Tanganyika, Native Affairs 1936). 
Similarly, “a truly phenomenal rainfall” in Owerri Province “severely injured the crops” and led 
to “widespread shortage of available food supplies” (Nigeria, Agricultural Report 1922). In The 
Gambia, as a result of abnormally heavy rainfall, the groundnut crop “suffered severely during 
the ripening and reaping period. [...] Fermentation was rapid and much damage was done to the 
nuts and to the quality of soil. The extent of this damage was widespread and felt throughout the 
country” (The Gambia, Agricultural Report 1927).  
Administrative accounts also link heavy rainfall to increased prevalence of plant diseases. 
In Ondo Province (Nigeria), ‘black pod disease’ destroyed an estimated 30 percent of the cocoa 
harvest during a year of heavy rainfall (Nigeria, Agricultural Report 1933). Reports also recount 
how parasitic organisms thrived under conditions of heavy rainfall. A serious increase in weevil 
infestation in the Trans Nzoia District (Kenya) was attributed to “abnormal[ly wet] weather 
conditions” (Kenya, Agricultural Report 1930).  
Examples of the negative impact of droughts as well as excessive rainfall on agriculture 
can be found in both very wet and very dry regions. That positive and negative rainfall shocks 
compromise agricultural outcomes in such a wide range of agro-ecological settings makes sense, 
considering that smallholders built their farming systems around an expected quantity of rainfall. 
Similarly, the physical environment was also conditioned by an expected level of rainfall. While 
lots of rain may seem beneficial to a dry savannah, its soils may be incapable of absorbing the 
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precipitation, resulting in run-off, floods and waterlogging. For example, Machakos (Kenya), a 
district with an average annual rainfall of only 40 inches, experienced an exceptionally wet year 
after a number of consecutive years of drought. A colonial officer noted that “despite the very 
heavy rain during the year, the condition of the Reserve has not improved; it has in fact 
degenerated further, particularly in regard to water supply. Owing to large areas being denuded 
of grass, the erosion caused by the heavy rains must have been enormous” (Kenya, Native Affairs 
1930).  
The administrative accounts frequently link rainfall shocks to food price spikes and 
subsequent social distress, which took the shape of increased petty crime and livestock raids and 
thefts. In Northern Nigeria in 1927, “the rainfall, which was considerably below the average, 
caused a partial failure of the guinea corn and yam crops in certain districts of the province. 
There was a definite shortage which caused the price of grain to soar to three or four times the 
normal price [from 0.12 to 0.65 pence per bag]” (Nigeria, Provincial Report 1927). The district 
commissioner concluded that “with the high prices which prevailed the native had a hard time to 
make both ends meet and a certain amount of distress has been apparent.” The police report of 
that same year reported that “petty theft was frequent in Kano. About April petty theft reached 
alarming proportions and special efforts were made to combat it.” The annual imprisonment 
rates exhibited an increase of about 61 per cent, forcing the Commissioner to state that “there is 
no doubt that the reason for the increase of crime is mainly economic” (Nigeria, Police Report 
1927). 
Examples like the ones above can be drawn systematically from the sources. The native 
commissioner of Turkana district, a pastoral area in Kenya, pointed out that the shortage of water 
and grazing resulting from a drought in 1929, “led to more migration and possibly more 
squabbles, crime and bloodshed than usual” (Kenya, Native Affairs 1930) Only four years later, 
“a phenomenal drought” led to “famine and poverty” as well as a “constant anxiety of raids and 
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massacres on the frontier. [...] The Turkana have been driven in unprecedented numbers to 
encroach on the grazing and water supplies of their more fortunate neighbours” (Kenya, Native 
Affairs 1933). In that same year, the severe drought and resultant stock mortality in the Masai 
District (Kenya) “led to an increase in crime. Actual hunger caused many sheep thefts and raids 
into Tanganyika Territory. Counter raids have proven serious.” The local imprisonment rate of 
the year exhibited a sharp increase from 255 to 408 convicts (Kenya, Native Affairs 1933). The 
Kenya police report of 1933 points out that “stock theft shows a 60 per cent. increase in the 
number of cases brought to court, while the number of persons convicted has nearly doubled. 
This large increase may be attributed to the difficult times experienced by the natives owing to 
the failure of the rains” (Kenya, Police Report 1933). 
An episode of abnormally high rainfall in Saltpond and Winneba District (Gold Coast) 
resulted in crop damage, failure and ‘resultant stress’, ‘shortage of the food supply’ and high 
prices. The incarcerated population increased by 25% and 37%, respectively (Gold Coast, 
Agricultural Report, 1925). In Rufiji District (Tanganyika) in 1930, “for a considerable period 
15,000 natives were homeless owing to the floods and many lost their houses, stock and crop.” 
The local police commissioner noted that “there was an increase of cattle theft, perhaps due to 
the shortage of food” and that “cases of theft predominated” mainly owing to the food shortage. 
The number of thefts rose to 1028 compared to 600 the previous year  – an increase of 71 per 
cent (Tanganyika, Native Affairs 1930). 
Conversely, colonial officers sometimes also explicitly attributed the absence of tension 
and distress to low prices due to favourable weather, which can be assumed to have positively 
impacted food production. The Gambia police, for example, noted that “with such favourable 
weather conditions coupled with the low price of foodstuffs, it was only to be expected that the 
crime figures should be satisfactory and never in the past 30 years has the total number of reports 
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of serious crime been so small as in 1934. It is too much to hope that such a peaceful state of 
affairs can become normal” (Gambia, Police Report 1934).  
While we find such causal inferences by colonial officials more plausible and satisfactory 
than the essentialistic assessments of the local population’s ‘natural responses’ to adverse 
conditions mentioned above, we should still receive them with a degree of scepticism since 
attributing social tension and distress to exogenous weather variation also conveniently diverted 
attention from the potential negative impact of colonial interventions themselves. 
 
3.2. Export crops and vulnerability  
Our study of the administrative record highlights that the impact of export crops on 
resilience in the wake of exogenous shocks was already a contested issue among colonial 
administrators. A southern Nigerian agricultural director expressed the concern that cocoa 
“considerably reduced the output of food”, and increased smallholders’ vulnerability to weather 
anomalies. An episode of “great shortage of food” was attributed “partially to the cocoa boom 
and partially to the drought” (Nigeria, Agriculture 1930). Likewise, the agricultural 
commissioner of Gold Coast stated in 1921 that “with the successful development of cocoa-
growing there has been a marked tendency to neglect the cultivation of foodstuffs and to depend 
on imported provisions. In an essentially agricultural country this is not satisfactory or what one 
might expect. In the same interior districts a shortage of foodstuffs is actually felt.” He argues 
that the shortage of food crops became so pronounced that “the value of local grown products 
has soared to unheard of prices in recent years,” leading to “widespread distress” (Gold Coast, 
Agriculture 1921).  
 Other colonial administrators were more optimistic, highlighting the diversification of risk 
that came with the adoption of export crops. A drought in Central Kavirondo (Kenya) “proved 
disastrous to food crops”, while the cotton crop “fared better [...]. The failure of the food crops 
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accentuated the value of cotton, for those who had it to sell were able to subsist on their own 
resources” (Kenya, Agriculture 1937). In addition, several native officers of Tanganyika reported 
that farmers only began cultivating export crops “when they had ensured for themselves and 
their dependents an adequate food crop” (Tanganyika, Native Affairs 1930), and that 
smallholders prioritized food security over cash income as “the planting of food crops is the first 
consideration and poor planting rains very often cause unavoidable delay in the planting of 
export crops such as cotton with the result that low yields are obtained” (Tanganyika, Native 
Affairs 1933). 
While we find that colonial reports are rather straightforward when it comes to the adverse 
impacts of negative and positive rainfall shocks on agriculture and, with some reservations, 
social tension and distress, we conclude that the reports are more ambiguous and problematic 
when it comes to assessing the role of agricultural commercialization. This ambiguity in the 
colonial sources reflect similar disagreement in the scholarly literature. We conclude that the 
reports are insufficiently impartial and too imprecise to provide us with much guidance in the 
process of assessing how export crop adoption affected the vulnerability of rural districts to 
weather fluctuations. Previous studies have used unpublished correspondence, fieldwork or oral 
history to probe beyond, and provide a counterweight to, the biases and limitations inherent in 
colonial administrative records. The labour intensive nature of such in-depth research has 
confined most studies to one particular colonial territory or district. We opt for a different 
research strategy by collecting quantitative data covering a wide geographical scope for 
econometric analysis. While we acknowledge that a wide range of, potentially opposing, 
mechanisms will underpin our overall findings, and that such mechanisms deserve full attention 
of scholars and policy makers, we find it equally worthwhile to draw up the balance, and take 
stock of the overall treatment effect of export crops on social tension and distress (cf. Kennedy & 
Von Braun, 1994). 




Our key variables of interest are imprisonment (the number of individuals admitted in 
year t) and rainfall (annual precipitation in inches in year t). We standardize both variables by 
computing their z-scores. Figure 2 provides a simple scatter-plot of the standardized rainfall 
anomalies against standardized annual imprisonment. Without any additional econometric 
testing, the figure brings out the non-linear (U-shaped) relationship between the two variables for 
the full sample. In other words, when rainfall deviates from the expected mean in either 
direction, the number of imprisoned individuals also spikes. We further explore this relationship 
econometrically in section 5 and include our export crop interaction effect in section 6. All 
variables, including our observable and unobservable controls are discussed below. Summary 
statistics are provided in Table 1.  
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Notes: Both indicators are the result of ‘standardizing’ process using the z-score computation: (xi,t - x̄i) / σi , where x̄i 
is the long-term mean of each district, xi,t is the annual observation in time t for district i, and σi is the standard 
deviation of each panel, that is for every i. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics: District by Year Data 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Panel (a): Dependent variables      
Total imprisonments * 2714 0.00 1.00 -2.60 3.70 
Imprisonments for debt * 2076 0.00 1.00 -1.70 3.50 
Imprisonments for less than 3 months* 2671 0.00 1.00 -2.30 3.80 
Imprisonments for more than 3 months* 2672 0.00 1.00 -2.80 3.90 
      
Panel (b): Independent variable of interest      
Rainfall long-term mean, Stations 2900 46.91 24.12 15.80 144.10 
Rainfall anomaly, Stations* 2529 0.00 1.00 -3.20 3.30 
Rainfall anomaly squared, Stations* 2529 1.00 1.32 0.00 10.89 
Absolute rainfall anomaly (Linear), Stations* 2529 0.80 0.58 0.00 3.30 
Rainfall long-term mean (Matsuura & Wilmott) 3200 47.01 21.73 12.70 139.70 
Rainfall anomaly (Matsuura &Wilmott) * 3200 0.00 1.00 -3.50 3.30 
Rainfall anomaly squared, (Matsuura & Wilmott) * 3200 1.00 1.33 0.00 12.25 
Absolute rainfall anomaly (Linear), (Matsuura & Wilmott) * 3200 0.81 0.58 0.00 3.50 
Negative rainfall shocks 2529 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Positive rainfall shocks 2529 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
      
Panel (c) Interaction variables      
Export crop production value (£) per capita 3220 0.52 1.47 0.00 10.10 
Export crop suitability, categorical (FAO-GAEZ) 
₤
 3220 3.72 0.81 1.05 5.51 
Food crop suitability, categorical (FAO-GAEZ)
 ₤
 2680 2.86 0.79 1.06 5.91 
      
Panel (d): Control variables (time-varying)      
Population density (persons per square mile) 3260 52.98 74.60 0.13 801.44 
Whites per 1000 of the population 3240 5.28 20.37 0.00 395.10 
World market prices of relevant export crops  2176 100.76 40.12 31.00 303.00 
      Panel (e): Control variables (time-invariant) 
     Rainfall coefficient of variation (CV) 2900 0.21 0.07 0.10 0.40 
Pre-colonial centralization, categorical (Murdock) 3180 2.45 0.94 1.00 4.00 
Railway, dummy 3260 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Settler agriculture, dummy 3260 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Cocoa cultivation, dummy  3260 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Coastal, dummy 3220 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Livestock units per 1000 of the population 3260 706.27 2197.98 0.00 24528.70 
Source: See sub-sections 2.4.1 till 2.44.   
            * indicates that the z-score computation was used to these variables. 
                   ₤
 indicates that these variables were re-scaled and run from 1 (least suitable) and 8 (most 
suitable)   
4.1 Rainfall 
To measure rainfall shocks, we use annual precipitation data from meteorological 
stations. The great majority of districts under British rule contained at least one such station. Our 
World Development  Papaioannou & de Haas 
23 
main explanatory variable is the absolute value of standardized rainfall deviation from the long-
term mean (AbsoluteRainfallDeviationi,t), which yields comparable results with the current 
economic literature (Hsiang  et al., 2013; Dell et al., 2014). In order to capture the non-linear 
effect of rainfall shocks on imprisonment, we also present the results using the rainfall deviation 
square term (RainfallDeviationSquarei,t). We also employ drought and excessive rainfall 
dummies, defining ‘negative rainfall shock’ as a dummy which takes the value of 1 when annual 
rainfall exceeds more than one standard deviation below, and ‘positive rainfall shock’ as one 
standard deviation above the long-run mean. This approach is similar to Iyer and Topalova 
(2014), Papaioannou (2017) and Jia (2014), among others. The summary statistics of the weather 
indicators are presented in panel (b) of Table 1. 
Our annual rainfall indicator does not capture the effects of years of normal annual 
rainfall with unfavourable distribution, nor years with below or above annual rainfall in which 
the abnormal precipitation occurred outside the growing season. Despite these limitations, we 
find the use of annual data largely unproblematic. Annual rainfall data is widely used in the 
economic literature (Miguel et al., 2004; Hsiang et al., 2013; Dell et al., 2014). Moreover, using 
annual rainfall figures for over ~2,500 observations is unlikely to result in a type I error (finding 
a relationship when there is none), but rather to underestimate the effect. A concern with our 
collected rainfall data could be that historical records have a tendency to suffer from under-
reporting and observer’s bias (Daly et al., 2007). Such bias may distort an annual total appear as 
a drought, when there really was none. To address such concerns, we replicate our results with 
rainfall data obtained from the University of Delaware dataset (Matsuura & Wilmott, 2009), 
which has been corrected for measurement bias.  
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4.2. Imprisonment  
We collect annual district-level data on total imprisonment (including remand prisoners), 
as well as three subcategories: (1) short imprisonments (3 months or less), (2) long 
imprisonments (>3 months)
2
 and (3) imprisonment for debt. Each district we include in our 
dataset has at least one prison within its borders. If more than one prison was present, we take 
the sum. Unfortunately, we do not possess specific information about convictions for different 
types of offenses. Yet, we argue that the convictions for petty property offences and tax and fine 
defaults, dominate the short imprisonments, whilst violent offences are likely to be much more 
prevalent among the long imprisonments. Following Blakeslee and Fishman (2014), Iyer and 
Topalova (2015) and Papaioannou (2017), who find that property crimes respond more strongly 
to economic distress than violent crimes, we expect the ‘short imprisonment’ variable to be more 
responsive to weather shocks than the ‘long imprisonment’ variable.  
It is important to state upfront that our research design (1) does not (intend to) capture 
variation in absolute levels of imprisonment across colonial districts, and (2) does not imply that 
colonial imprisonment should be attributed primarily to harvest failures, let alone climate. 
Colonial coercive capacity varied considerably from place to place (both across districts and 
colonies), and incarceration happened to an extent at the discretion of local administrative 
officers or native authorities. Colonial imprisonment was an instrument of social control, used to 
lock up criminal, deviant and destitute elements of society, including debt, tax and fine defaulters 
(Bernault, 2007; Branch, 2005; Hynd, 2011; Killingray, 1986).  
Within this context, we can exploit annual fluctuations of imprisonment to assess the 
impact of rainfall extremes on distress. If weather extremes result in loss of agricultural income, 
and if people have no buffer to cushion this loss of income, we may expect a rise in behaviours 
and activities that result in imprisonment, including: (1) incidences of distress-induced petty 
property theft (cf. Papaioannou, 2017), (2) tax, debt and fine defaults resulting in imprisonment 
                                                 
2
 For Kenya, the cut-off point is >6 months. Excluding Kenya from the analysis does not change our results.  
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(Hynd, 2011); and (3) rebellion and civil disobedience in responses to the fact that rulers prove 
unable to provide people with a basic level of security and income. Note that our interpretation 
explicitly accounts for the fact that behaviours resulting in colonial imprisonment may not have 
been perceived as ‘criminal’ by African populations, and that we use the descriptive term 
‘imprisonment’ rather than the more contentious ‘crime’.   
We exploit the following logic to test if weather shocks have a different impact on social 
tension and distress (i.e. imprisonment) in districts with smallholder-based export crop 
cultivation compared to districts without. When, in a particular district, imprisonment spikes are 
pronounced during years of weather shocks (i.e. inflated numbers of debt, tax and fine default, 
petty thefts and incidences of civil obedience), we take this as an indication that this district is 
particularly vulnerable to such shocks. If, in another district, imprisonment spikes are mild or 
absent in years of weather shocks, we take this as an indication that people were able to (1) 
prevent a fall in agricultural income, for example by cultivating a more diversified or weather-
resistant crop portfolio, or (2) cushion the impact of such a fall, for example through the 
presence of a food relief campaign, or the availability of stored wealth to compensate for lost 
income. More discussion on potential mechanisms is provided in the conclusion.  
We are aware that imprisonment is an imperfect measure of social distress. Males were 
strongly overrepresented in Africa’s colonial prisons, so we are unfortunately not able to capture 
the gendered impact of weather shocks, which is a particularly regrettable omission considering 
women’s crucial role in agricultural production (Carswell, 2003; MacKenzie, 1999; Vaughan, 
1987). Similarly, our data also does not allow us to assess the heterogeneous impact of weather 
shocks on different social classes or occupational groups. Finally, we have no information about 
the exact reasons of imprisonment. Despite these limitations, the variable also has its own 
pronounced strengths. Imprisonment figures are highly responsive to small fluctuations, and the 
data is uniquely consistent over a considerable geographical and temporal scope. Moreover, we 
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have no reason to believe that the link between annual rainfall and imprisonment statistics was 
somehow the result of systematic and purposeful manipulation by colonial officials (who could 
not have fathomed that future research would use yet-to-be-developed econometric techniques to 
investigate the relationship between rainfall shocks, imprisonment and export crops). Our 
quantitative results, therefore, are much less susceptible to the kind of colonial manipulation that 
biases the narrative record.  
 
4.3. Export crop production 
To measure the impact of agricultural commercialization on vulnerability to weather 
shocks, we have constructed a new indicator to estimate export crop production at the district 
level. This indicator is based on the average value (1920-1939) of colony-level exports of export 
crops (Frankema et al., 2015), divided over the districts within the colonies on the basis of 
colonial maps and smallholder acreage, and production estimates that tell us where export crops 
were cultivated. We standardize the values using district population estimates. More details are 
provided in Appendix B. Figure 3 shows the value per capita of smallholder-grown export crops 
for each of the districts in our dataset divided into four quartiles (and the top decile separated 
from the remainder of the first quartile). The resulting spatial distribution of export crop incomes 
is in accordance with our expectations. Smallholder export crops in interwar British colonial 
Africa were concentrated in The Gambia (groundnuts), coastal Ghana (cocoa), coastal Nigeria 
(cocoa and palm oil), northern Nigeria (cotton and groundnuts), the Lake Victoria area (cotton 
and coffee), coastal Tanzania (cotton, copra and cloves) and southern Malawi (cotton and 
tobacco). As expected, the cocoa growing regions in Ghana and Nigeria produce the highest 
export values per capita.  
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Figure 3. Export crop production estimate 
 
Sources: Map constructed by the authors in ArcGIS on the basis of digitized colonial maps. See Appendix B online 
for further information 
 
In the remainder of our analysis, we split our dataset into halves, the bottom half 
representing districts in which smallholder production was subsistence oriented, and the top half 
those in which smallholders cultivated significant amounts of export crops. We have made sure 
that our results are not driven by a random cut-off point by using alternative cut-off points, 
quartiles and trimmed samples. Still, we admit that the distinction between “export” and 
“subsistence” districts is rudimentary. Some districts which did not cultivate crops for export 
were involved in the commercial production of food crops for local markets. For example, 
Carswell (2003) argues that smallholders in Kigezi District (Uganda) cultivated ‘food crops as 
export crops’ (cf. Von Braun & Kennedy, 1994). We maintain, however, that the income from 
commercialized food crop cultivation tended to be small compared to income from export crops, 
for the following reasons: (1) marketing infrastructure in the colonial era was geared towards 
export and not interregional food trade, (2) markets for food crops were small due to low 
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urbanization rates and land-abundance, (3) universal cultivation of food crops resulted in low 
market value in good years and food scarcity in bad years (Binswanger & McIntyre, 1987; De 
Janvry et al., 1991). The main source of income in non-export crop districts tended to be labour 
migration to more commercialized areas.
3
 Our dataset also includes some districts which were 
dominated by settler agriculture, urban centres or mining areas, for which we control in our 
analysis (by excluding them from subsamples). While measurements on the district level may 
brush over within-district variation, our approach is much more refined than most related 
contributions covering similarly large areas, which tend to distinguish ‘peasant’ and ‘settler’ 
economies at the country level (Bowden et al. 2008; Moradi & Baten, 2005), and even to classify 
Africa into macro-regions (Amin, 1972). 
To provide more robust evidence for the causal impact of export crop cultivation, we 
construct an alternative export crop indicator which is exogenously determined. This indicator is 
based on crop suitability indices for the most important export crops (cocoa, coffee, cotton, 
tobacco, palm oil, groundnuts and coconuts) obtained from the FAO-GAEZ project. This 
suitability index runs from 1 (most suitable) to 8 (least suitable).
4
 Similar to other studies that 
have successfully exploited the exogenous nature of the crop suitability indicators to proxy for 
adoption or production of various types of crops (Nunn & Qian, 2014; Jia, 2014; Fenske & Kala, 
2015), we take the average of the gridded suitability values within the borders of each colonial 
district. We construct our indicator by combining all relevant export crops, using the average 
suitability for all export crops for each districts.
5
  
Using export crop suitability increases our confidence that institutional factors do not 
drive our results. However, districts which were more suitable to export crops may have been 
those with generally more suitable land, better soil and more favourable rainfall patterns. To rule 
                                                 
3
 Which was also a key source of income among the smallholders in Kigezi described in Carswell (2003) 
4
 To facilitate interpretation, we have re-scaled this variable so that 1 denotes ‘least suitable’ and 8 ‘most suitable’). 
5
 We also created an indicator that includes only the single most suitable export crop per district. Using this 
alternative indicator yielded very similar results. 
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out the possibility that our indicator of export crop suitability captures general agricultural 
suitability (which may in its own right result in higher weather-shock resilience), we also 
construct an indicator of food crop suitability, equally based on FAO-GAEZ data. We include, 
maize, millet, sorghum, cassava, yam, potato, sweet potato and rice, and follow a similar 
procedure as described above for our export crop suitability indicator. 
 
4.4. Control variables  
We include a number of time-variant controls, reported in Table 1, panel (d). Firstly, 
annual total population is estimated on the basis of colonial ‘native’ censuses, and expressed in 
terms of population density (per square mile). White population per 1000 of the population is 
estimated on the basis of ‘non-native’ censuses. World market prices of relevant export 
commodities are taken from Wageningen African Commodity Trade Database (Frankema et al., 
2015).  
Secondly, we include a range of observable time-invariant controls, reported in Table 1, 
panel (e). Pre-colonial centralization is based on the variable “Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond 
Local Community” in Murdock’s ethnographical atlas (Gray 1999). Pre-colonial chiefdoms and 
states are defined as places with more than one level of jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local 
community. Livestock per 1000 of the population is estimated on the basis of the district 
averages of livestock censuses (1920-1939). We use observable time-invariant controls to 
control for the interaction of several observable district-specific characteristics with a linear time 
trend to take into account their heterogeneous impact (if any) over time. For example, districts 
with high presence of livestock may become more (or less) resilient in 1939 than in 1920, due to 
stock accumulation.  
Thirdly, we use unobservable time-invariant controls, reported in Table 1, panel (f). This 
set of controls is estimated by interacting each district with a linear time trend and labelled 
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district-specific effects (DSE). They control for any other unobservable characteristics that we 
may expect to change over time, such as the possibility that (a) colonial authorities extended 
their coercive capacity over time (Branch, 2005); (b) previous episodes of distress have made 
districts more vulnerable, affecting future responses to weather shocks; (c) regions with higher 
incomes are better off over time because they are able to store wealth; and (d) distress may have 
been attenuated by the gradual expansion of public infrastructure such as roads and railways, 
facilitating food relief programs.  
5. Results: Rainfall and imprisonment 
5.1. Model 
To test the effect of rainfall shocks on social distress, we estimate the following equation:  
Y i,t    β1 AbsoluteRainfallDeviationi,t   δZˊi,t  νi  μt  (observable  time)i,t 
  (unobservable  time)i,t  εi,t .      (1) 
where Y i,t denotes the annual standard deviation of imprisonment. AbsoluteRainfallDeviationi,t  
denotes the absolute rainfall deviation of each district i from the historical long-term mean of the 
same district. Zˊi,t denotes a vector of institutional and economic determinants of tension which 
we control for in order to avoid any potential omitted variable bias. νi and μt are district and year 
fixed effects, respectively. We use these to control for omitted heterogeneity at the level of 
districts and time periods. These controls are crucial in controlling for factors that may affect the 
levels of prisoners across all districts in the same year, such distress caused by the Great 
Depression. To address autocorrelation concerns of weather shocks the standard errors are 
clustered by district.  (Observable  time)i,t  denotes the observable district specific 
characteristics when interacted with a linear time trend (t) and (unobservable  time)i,t denotes 
district-specific effects (DSE). εit is the error term. In all estimations we control for spatial 
correlation (cross-sectional dependence) by adjusting standard errors following Hoechle (2007). 
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This way we deal with the issue of migration and spatial spill-overs of distress (for example 
‘hunger’ migration across district borders). 
 
5.2. Results 
Table 2 presents our main results, which indicate a robust and significant effect of 
weather shocks on social distress. The absolute term of rainfall deviation yields a positive sign 
and maintains a highly statistical significant coefficient throughout our different specifications 
(columns 1-5). The results in column 4 indicate our preferred and most robust specification. A 
one standard deviation increase or decrease in rainfall causes a 25 standard deviation increase in 
social distress. This result is crucial not only for its statistical significance but also for its 
economic significance.  
Table 2. Weather Shocks and Social Distress 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Imprisonment deviation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Absolute rainfall deviation 0.2919 0.2744 0.2700 0.2509 0.1698 
 
  [8.55]*** [6.71]*** [6.66]*** [6.41]*** [3.74]*** 
Population density     
0.0024 
    
[0.82] 
Whites per 1000 of the population     
0.0059 
    
[0.31] 
World market prices      
-0.0015 
    
[-0.71] 
District FE         N Y Y Y Y 
Time dummies N Y Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N  N Y N N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  year)         N                   N         N Y Y 
Number of observations 2335 2335 2246 2335 1665 
Number of districts 143 143 137 143 104 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. We adjust standard 
errors for spatial dependency following Hoechle (2007). Given that observable characteristics are redundant once district-specific 
effects (DSE) are included, we present the results only after controlling for DSE. Including observable characteristics instead of 
DSE does not change the results. 
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In Table 3, we include the square term of RainfallDeviationi,t and find that the effect of 
weather shocks on imprisonment is curvilinear (U-shaped), meaning that both drought and 
excessive rainfall give rise to higher levels of conviction (columns 1-5). We also test for the 
symmetricity of the effect by including the ‘positive rainfall shock’ and ‘negative rainfall shock’ 
variables into the analysis. A standard deviation increase in rainfall beyond the mean causes a 
0.33 standard deviation increase in imprisonment. Likewise, a standard deviation decrease in 
rainfall causes a 0.25 standard deviation increase in imprisonment. A possible explanation of this 
asymmetry is that in years of excessive rainfall farmers would lose their entire harvest in a 
relatively shorter time, whereas in years of drought farmers could hope for late rains.  
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Table 3. Curvilinear effect of weather shocks on social distress 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Imprisonment deviation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Rainfall deviation  0.0189 0.0108 0.0140 0.0139 0.0081      
 
[0.93] [0.47] [0.66] [0.61] [0.29]      
Rainfall deviation squared 0.1287 0.1223 0.1179 0.1103 0.0763      
 
[8.41]*** [6.34]*** [6.06]*** [6.11]*** [3.63]***      
Positive rainfall shock      0.3905 0.3354 0.3156 0.3074 0.1937 
        [7.21]*** [4.98]*** [4.90]*** [4.69]*** [2.39]** 
Negative rainfall shock      0.2762 0.2595 0.2516 0.2375 0.1499 
        [5.11]*** [4.15]*** [4.08]*** [4.08]*** [2.23]** 
Population density      
0.0047     0.0045 
    
   [1.35]     [1.31] 
Whites per 1000 of the population     
0.0160     0.1141 
    
[0.58]     [0.42] 
World market prices      
-0.0012     -0.012 
    
  [-0.57]     [-0.57] 
District FE N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 
Time dummies N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N N Y N N N N Y N N 
District-specific effects   (unobservable  year)             N                  N N Y Y N N N Y Y 
Number of observations 2335 2335 2246 2335 1665 2335 2335 2246 2335 1665 
Number of districts 143 143 137 143 104 143 143 137 143 104 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 
percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. We adjust standard errors for spatial dependency following Hoechle 
(2007).
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The impact of a rainfall shock on distress may not be immediate but only felt the next year. 
Table 4 presents the results when we include lagged weather shocks as determinants of 
imprisonment.  Column 1 shows that social distress is not associated with lags of rainfall shocks. 
In column 2, none of the interactions have a significant impact on imprisonment and they are 
jointly not statistically significant (with a p-value of 0.25). This suggests that the observed spikes 
in imprisonment in our data are caused by weather shocks in that same year (leading to 
immediate losses in agricultural income), rather than prolonged episodes of adverse weather. 
Table 4. The impact of Lagged Weather Conditions 
Dependent variable  (1) (2) 
Imprisonment deviation  OLS OLS 
Positive rainfall shock t  0.3404 0.3772 
  [4.99]*** [5.25]*** 
Negative rainfall shock t  0.2422 0.2422 
  [3.71]***   [3.58]*** 
Positive rainfall shock t - 1  0.0184 0.0563 
  [0.36] [1.04] 
Negative rainfall shock t - 1  0.0700 0.0697 
  [1.16] [1.10] 
Positive rainfall shock t   positive rainfall shock t - 1    -0.2407 
   [-1.64] 










Observable controls  year 
 
 N N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  year)                                              Y Y 
Number of observations  2178 2178 
Number of districts  143 143 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard 
errors are clustered at the district level. We adjust standard errors for spatial dependency following 
Hoechle (2007). 
 
In Table 5, we show the results after distinguishing among the different types of 
prisoners. As argued before (section 4.2), we expect short term imprisonments to be most 
responsive to weather shocks. This is confirmed by our estimation. The effect of weather shocks 
on convictions of maximum 3 months is almost twice as large as the effect for convictions above 
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3 months (columns 1-2). Debt is also statistically significant, which suggests that weather-
induced loss of incomes resulted in higher levels of debt default (column 3).   
Table 5. Results with alternative dependent variables 
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) 
Convictions    
<3 months 
Convictions   
>3 months 
Debt 
Absolute rainfall deviation 0.2114 0.1281 0.1005 
  [4.77]*** [2.99]*** [2.89]*** 
District FE Y Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N  N N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  year) Y Y Y 
Number of observations 2250 2280 1797 
Number of districts 142 144 109 
Notes: OLS-FE estimator. Sample period: 1920–1939. Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics 
are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 
percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. We adjust standard errors for 
spatial dependency following Hoechle (2007). 
 
5.3. Robustness  
We perform a range of robustness exercises reported in the Appendix. In Table A-1, we 
show that the results are largely unchanged when we replace rainfall anomalies obtained from 
meteorological stations with an alternative measure of rainfall obtained from the University of 
Delaware world rainfall dataset (Matsuura and Wilmott, 2009). In Table A-2, we distinguish 
between limited drought and excess rainfall (one standard deviation from the long-term rainfall 
mean) and exceptional drought and excess rainfall (one and a half standard deviation from the 
mean). The results show that the impact of limited drought and excess rainfall is smaller than the 
impact of exceptional drought and excess rainfall. The effect increases gradually as the deviation 
becomes larger, suggesting that the data on weather shocks make intuitive sense. In Table A-3 
we include the lag of the dependent variable and run a dynamic panel data model (system-
GMM). This specification gives nearly identical results. Table A-4, reports the impact of 
different combinations of the lags and leads. The effect remains unchanged when we control for 
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the impact of lagged rainfall shocks at time t - 1 and t – 2. Drought and excess rainfall in the lags 
and leads did not have any significant impact on distress. In Table A-5, we show that the results 
are robust to clustering standard errors at different levels; standard errors are clustered at the year 
level, country level as well as two-way clustered at both the year and the country level. Again 
results are similar to our baseline.  
6. Results: The Mitigating Effect of Export Crops 
6.1. Model 
To test the mitigating effect of export crop cultivation on social distress, we estimate the 
following equation:  
Yi,t    β1 AbsoluteRainfallDeviationi,t + π (CashCropProduction  
AbsoluteRainfallDeviation)i,t + δZˊi,t + νi + μt  + (observable  time)i,t + 
(unobservable  time)i,t + εi,t .       (2) 
where (CashCropProduction  AbsoluteRainfallDeviation)i,t  denotes the interaction of above 
median export crop production with absolute rainfall deviation (linear). The remainder of the 
variables in this specification is discussed in section 5. 
6.2. Results 
The results are presented in Table 6. They strongly suggest that access to export crops mitigated 
the effect of weather shocks on social distress (columns 1-3). We also examine whether the 
effect remains unchanged when we use the export crop suitability index (columns 4-6). Indeed, 
districts where export crop suitability was high (above median) were less severely affected in 
years of weather shocks. The lower coefficients of our suitability indicator may reflect the fact 
that not all areas suitable for export crop cultivation were actually cultivating export crops.  
These results conform with our finding that the overall treatment effect of export crops on local 
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farmers was positive. Column 3, which is our preferred estimation, shows that export crops 
attenuated the effect of weather shocks on social distress by 24.5 per cent.  
Table 6. The Mitigating Effect of Export crops 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Imprisonment deviation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Absolute rainfall deviation 
0.3393 0.3416 0.3178 0.3173 0.3236 0.2990 
[7.21]*** [7.41]*** [7.22]*** [6.66]*** [6.93]*** [6.75]*** 
Export crop production  
absolute rainfall deviation 
-0.2376 -0.2765 -0.2456    
[-2.80]*** [-3.26]*** [-3.02]***    
Export crop suitability  
absolute rainfall deviation 
   -0.1521 -0.2488 -0.1761 
   [-1.99]** [-2.26]** [-2.09]** 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N Y N N Y N 
District-specific effects 
 (unobservable  year)                          N                      N Y N N Y 
Number of observations 2335 2246 2335 2335 2246 2335 
Number of districts 143 137 143 141 135 141 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. The standard errors are  clustered at the district 
level. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors 
are clustered at the district level. 
6.3. Robustness  
Before making any claims about causality, one would like to know more about the 
relationship between export crop production and other district specific characteristics. Was the 
cultivation of export crops endogenously determined by an underlying variable that may also 
explain our results? To put it differently, was the cultivation of export crops conditional upon 
institutional, geographical or economic district characteristics that may also have had a direct 
mitigating effect on weather-induced vulnerability? A strong overlap between centralized 
political institutions and export crop production, for example, may raise a concern that such 
institutions explain both higher levels of export crop production, and lower vulnerability to 
weather shocks. In these scenarios, our export crop indicator would capture the effect of an 
omitted variable. To mitigate such concerns, we provide a number of robustness tests. First, we 
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provide  a simple OLS estimation to see if the production of export crops is determined by any 
observable district characteristics. We proceed by estimating the following specification: 
Exportcrop Productioni   Exportcrop Suitabilityi + φVi + θi  (3) 
Where Vi  is a vector including the different categories of district characteristics. The 
characteristics are divided in three categories: institutional, economic and demographic. 
Institutional characteristics include the colonial presence measured by whites per 1.000 of the 
population; pre-colonial centralization measured with data taken from Murdock’s Ethnographic 
Atlas; the coercive capacity of the colonial state measured by a twenty year-average of prisoners 
per 1.000 of the population; and colonial investments measured by the existence of a railway 
(dummy). Geographical characteristics include controls for the length of the rainy season; 
degree of aridity/humidity of the climate, measured by the 20 year-average rainfall per district; 
the variability of rainfall using the coefficient of variation (CV) of rainfall for each district; direct 
access to international trade measured by a coastal dummy; and the suitability for food crops. 
Economic characteristics include alternative sources of income, including livestock measured 
per 1.000 of the population; rural wage labour measured by the presence of settlers (dummy); 
and population density as a proxy for land scarcity.
6
  
The correlations are presented in Table 7. Column 1 demonstrates that our measure of 
cash crop production and crop suitability are highly correlated at the 1 per cent level of 
significance and with a coefficient greater than 0.95, which serves as validation of the empirical 
strategy. For robustness, instead of taking the average of all cash crops, we only include the 
single most suitable cash crop per district (results do not change and are not reported). Columns 
2-4 present the results from the institutional, geographical and economic controls in turn. 
Column 5 presents the results when we jointly include the controls. The results suggest that there 
                                                 
6
 We have also controlled for, but not report, the possibility that, coincidentally, the growing season in export crop districts 
occurs later in the year than in food crop regions, which would imply that the expected effect of rainfall shocks in year t only 
shows up in these districts in year t+1. Although we find that the effect of rainfall shocks on imprisonment was indeed 
significantly lower in districts in which the rainy season spills over into the next year, we do not find that the timing of the rainy 
season and the production of export crops significantly overlap. 
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are no statistically significant correlations between the observed district characteristics and 
export crop production.  
Table 7. Correlations between export crops and district characteristics 
 Dependent variable: Export crop Production 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS  OLS  OLS OLS OLS 
Export crop suitability  0.9583 0.9217 0.9283 0.9506 1.1992 
  [6.63]*** [6.68]*** [5.74]*** [6.23]*** [6.14]*** 
Institutional controls 
     
     
Colonial Presence  -0.0011   -0.0014 
  [-0.44]   [-0.39] 
Pre-colonial chiefdom  0.2062   0.0259 
  [0.87]   [0.18] 
Coercive capacity  0.0169   0.0116 
  [1.57]   [1.25] 
Railway dummy  0.0738   0.0773 
  [0.34]   [0.31] 
Geographical controls      
Length of rainy season   0.1163  0.1018 
   [1.59]  [1.22] 
Rainfall long-term average   -0.0001  0.0031 
   [-0.02]  [0.51] 
Rainfall variability CV   -1.3015  -1.7054 
   [-1.37]  [-1.01] 
Coastal dummy   -0.3984  -0.5408 
   [-1.21]  [-1.49] 
Food crop suitability   0.1829  0.1515 
   [0.76]  [0.61] 
Economic controls      
Livestock per 10.000 population    -0.0001 -0.0002 
    [-0.47] [-0.76] 
Settler farming dummy    -0.2642 -0.5392 
    [-0.93] [-1.61] 
Population density    -0.0006 -0.0011 
  [-0.16] [-0.91] 
Number of observations 159 151 139 156 133 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. The standard errors are  clustered at the 
district level. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
 
Additionally, we interact alternative explanations with absolute rainfall deviation (linear) and 
include this term in the regression. The most important results are presented in Table 8. Since 
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our export crop indicator is cross-sectional, we were concerned that the mitigating effect of 
export crops was concentrated either at the beginning or end of our period (1920-1939). To deal 
with this concern, we interact absolute rainfall deviation (linear) with a time trend and include 
this term in the regression (column 1). No statistically observable trend for the mitigating impact 
of export crops was found.  
To reaffirm that our ‘export crop effect’ is not driven by overall agricultural suitability, 
we perform a so-called ‘placebo test’ with food crop suitability. We split our sample into two 
halves (above and below median food crop suitability), and interact both absolute rainfall 
deviation with food crop suitability (FoodCropSuitability  AbsoluteRainfallDeviation) and 
export crop production (CashCropProduction  AbsoluteRainfallDeviation). As shown in 
column 2, the regression results show that impact of food crop suitability on imprisonment 
deviation is close to 0. Hence, suitability to food crop cultivation does not explain export crop 
districts’ greater resilience to social distress in the wake of weather shocks. This finding further 
enhances our confidence that the actual presence of export crops explains our heterogeneous 
results.  
Additional ‘horse race tests’ are provided in Table A-6, which refute alternative 
institutional, geographical and income-related explanations that might (directly or indirectly) 
compete with export crop cultivation as an explanation for our heterogeneous results. The 
mitigating effect of export crops remain virtually unchanged.  
Finally, we also check the robustness of our estimates to the use of alternative samples. A 
first concern is the possibility that higher spikes of imprisonment in our below-median export 
crop sample is not driven by the absence of export crops, but by the presence of settlers (all 
settler districts end up in the below-median export crop sample). A potential concern here would 
be that land alienation and extractive institutions in settler districts could potentially have an 
aggravating effect on social distress. We thus exclude the settler districts from the analysis 
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(column 3) and find that our results remain robust. A second issue is that the mitigating effect of 
export crops is driven by districts with cocoa, which are sometimes portrayed as an exceptional 
case of successful export crop adoption. To rule out the possibility that our export crop 
interaction effect is driven by cocoa, we created a sub-sample excluding the cocoa districts from 
the analysis, and find that our results remain robust (column 4).  
Table 8. Robustness checks: Trends, Food Crops and Sub-Samples 
Dependent variable  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Imprisonment deviation OLS  OLS   OLS OLS 
Absolute rainfall deviation  0.4270 0.3158  0.3613 0.3179 
  [5.22]*** [7.12]***  [7.57]*** [6.77]*** 
Export crop production  absolute rainfall deviation  
-0.2355 -0.2445  -0.2290 -0.2482 
[-2.94]*** [-3.01]***    [-2.57]***   [-3.00]*** 
      
Absolute rainfall deviation  trend -0.0103     
 [-1.52]     
Food crop suitability  absolute rainfall deviation  0.0475    
  [0.21]    
District FE Y Y  Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y  Y Y 
Observable controls  year N N  N N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  year)                         Y                       Y  Y Y 
Number of observations 2335 2335  1909 2199 
Number of districts 141 141  115 133 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. The standard errors are  clustered at the district 
level. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent.  
7. Conclusion 
This study has investigated two key questions. First, to what extent did weather shocks 
induce higher levels of social distress in colonial British Africa? Second, to what extent did the 
cultivation of export crops mitigate weather-induced distress? Building on newly collected data, 
it makes two contributions. First, our findings suggest that both annual drought and excessive 
rainfall are strongly associated with spikes in imprisonment. On the basis of previous literature 
and our reading of colonial administrative reports, we conclude that the key pathway linking 
rainfall shocks to spiking imprisonment rates is that of falling agricultural incomes. Second, we 
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find that the production of export crops had a mitigating effect on weather-induced social 
distress. In the context of interwar British colonial Africa, districts with more export crops 
experienced less pronounced spikes of imprisonment in years of weather shocks than those 
districts with few or none at all. We argue that the presence of export crops drives our 
heterogeneous result, which holds up to a battery of performed robustness tests that effectively 
refute a wide range of plausible alternative explanations. Overall, our findings suggest that the 
surplus revenues generated by export crops partially alleviated negative rural income shocks.
7
  
Our findings are set in the historical context of interwar British colonial Africa. 
Nevertheless, many African smallholders today still face agricultural and climatological 
conditions resembling those found in this historical setting. We posit therefore, that our highly 
significant and robust findings on the adverse effects of weather fluctuations, and the mitigating 
effect of agricultural commercialization bear great relevance for today’s vulnerable rural 
societies, particularly in the contemporary context of accelerating climate change, which 
generates more severe and frequent weather extremes.  
That even in a colonial context, smallholder-based export crop cultivation had a mitigating 
effect on weather-induced distress, suggests that a key policy priority should be to provide 
smallholders with the ability to produce for external markets. At the same time it would be 
unwarranted, even reckless, to claim that ‘state sponsored’ export crops are a ‘magic bullet’, or 
even that agricultural commercialization more generally is universally beneficial to mitigating 
rural societies’ vulnerability to weather shocks. When interpreting our findings, it is particularly 
important to consider the fact that (i) most of colonial tropical Africa was land abundant, that (ii) 
African farmers combined cultivation of export and subsistence crops, and that (iii) smallholders 
                                                 
7
 Our findings are in line with Burgess and Donaldson (2010) for colonial India and with Papaioannou 
(2017) for colonial South and Southeast Asia; both arguing that openness to trade and crop diversification provide 
an alternative insurance mechanism to rural households in coping with adverse weather shocks. 
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generally did not have to incur debts to participate in cultivation for export, despite the fact that 
inputs were low and farming techniques basic. Moreover, in districts that were unsuitable for the 
cultivation of export crops, their introduction would not be a viable strategy to cope with climate 
extremes. 
Our empirical strategy enabled us to tease out the robust overall effect export crops had 
in reducing weather-induced social distress. The scope of our analysis and the scarcity of reliable 
data prevented us from analyzing the complex, variegated set of mechanisms through which 
agricultural commercialization mitigates the vulnerability of African farmers. Our findings 
should, therefore, be interpreted in the light of the existing rich literature, in which such 
mechanisms are exposed in greater detail.  
Three complementary sets of entangled mechanisms require particular consideration. 
Firstly, how does agricultural commercialization affect food production in years of abnormal 
weather? Previous literature has suggested that the (partial) substitution of food crops with 
export crops resulted in the disappearance of food buffers and, as a result, increased the degree 
of rural vulnerability after a disappointing harvest. This food-crop/export-crop substitution effect 
may be aggravated by the fact that some export crops, such as cotton or tobacco, are non-edible 
and highly labor intensive. Yet it still remains ill-understood how the cultivation of export crops 
could have enhanced resilience in the light of this substitution mechanism. The introduction of 
new, exportable crops may reduce the risk of complete harvest failure, as weather conditions 
often impact export crops and local food crops differently (Maxwell & Fernando 1989; Morton, 
2007). Furthermore, ‘state sponsored’ export crops tend to include extension services, 
agricultural innovations and new technological inputs, all or any of which may boost the 
productivity of food crops as well (Goetz, 1993). Despite few high-yielding food crop varieties 
being brought to smallholders in colonial Africa, the adoption of export crops did coincide with a 
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partial switch to less labor-intensive and more drought-resistant food crops, such as cassava 
which, although less nutritious, have enhanced food security (Tosh, 1980). 
Secondly, how does agricultural commercialization affect household incomes in years of 
harvest failure? If the cultivation of export crops provokes food shortages in bad years, it may 
still enhance smallholders’ abilities to smooth consumption and obtain food on the market. 
Commercial production enables households to convert (a part of) their harvest into storable 
wealth (such as cash or livestock), enabling the purchase of food in bad years. This ‘consumption 
smoothing’ is conditional upon smallholders actually receiving the income benefits from export 
crop cultivation, which is not self-evident. Structural indebtedness or excessive taxation may 
negatively impact storable wealth, preventing smallholders from utilizing their export crop 
income to alleviate distress (Bates, 1981; Scott, 1976). While the colonial tax burden on 
smallholder export crops could be excessive indeed, it was not high enough to completely annul 
the gains in purchasing power arising from export crop cultivation (De Haas, 2017).  
Thirdly, how does agricultural commercialization affect collective coping and relief 
mechanisms in years of harvest failure? The adoption of export crops does not only have 
repercussions on the level of the individual smallholder, but also on the broader institutional and 
infrastructural context. While scholars have argued that rural commercialization erodes pre-
capitalist, ‘moral economy’ insurance institutions (Fafchamps, 1992; Scott, 1976; Watts, 1983), 
the revenue-generating potential of export crop regions may also provide the state with the 
means to invest in technology diffusion, infrastructure and food security (Govereh & Jayne, 
2003; Burgess and Donaldson, 2010; Papaioannou, 2017).  
We find it plausible that each of the three channels described above contributes to 
explaining the overall mitigating effect of export crops found in this study, whilst reiterating that 
colonial occupation may – through excessive taxation, insufficient commitment to rural 
development or insistence on a limited set of ‘state sponsored’ export crops – have prevented 
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smallholders from realizing maximum potential benefit from agricultural commercialization. 
Further disentangling the mechanisms suggested above should continue to be a top priority for 
scholars and policy makers.  
We suggest a number of directions for future research. Firstly, in relation to the 
discussion above, it would be of particular interest to see if the effect of export crops is primarily 
channelled through higher private income or through public investments in infrastructure and 
food aid programs. Secondly, further study may uncover different results for aspects of distress 
not touched upon in this paper, such as malnutrition or uneven vulnerabilities across class and 
gender. Thirdly, it would be valuable to give focused attention to the actual adoption of different 
types of export crops and identify conditions determining successful adoption. Our finding that 
export crop suitability mattered for the adoption of export crops implies that areas  unsuitable for 
such traditional export crops require different commercialization strategies; whether that being a 
higher reliance on drought-resistant food crops, such as cassava or sorghum, or alternative, non-
agricultural ‘roads to openness’. Fourthly, while this study finds a short term mitigating effect of 
export crops on social distress, it does not address the long-term effects, which may include the 
risk of overspecialization in a primary commodity or the adverse environmental impacts of 
agricultural commercialization. Thus, a more complete understanding of the impact of export 
crops would require further empirical study into the long-run effects of these crops.  
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Appendix A. Robustness Tests 
Table A-1. Main results with absolute rainfall deviation, Grids 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Imprisonment deviation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Absolute rainfall deviation (Grids) 0.1632 0.1794 0.1636 0.1689 0.1667 
 
[4.95]*** [4.89]*** [4.63]*** [5.07]*** [3.85]*** 
Population density      
0.0045 
    
   [1.35] 
Whites per 1000 of the population     
0.0117 
    
[0.45] 
World market prices      
-0.0010 
    
  [-0.52] 
District FE N Y Y Y Y 
Time dummies N Y Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N N Y N N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  year)       N                   N N Y Y 
Number of observations 2680 2680 2422 2680 1827 
Number of districts 156 156 137 156 105 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are 
clustered at the district level. 
 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exceptional positive rainfall shock 0.3256 0.3566 0.3627 0.3540 
         [3.38]***          [3.79]***        [3.84]***      [3.69]*** 
Exceptional negative rainfall shock 0.3259 0.2955 0.2461 0.2204 
 [3.32]***   [2.78]*** [2.37]**   [2.26]** 
Limited positive rainfall shock 0.2523 0.1799 0.1573 0.1558 
 [3.73]*** [2.36]** [2.12]** [2.07]** 
Limited negative rainfall shock 0.1522 0.1448 0.1585 0.1540 
 [2.32]** [2.06]** [2.38]** [2.55]** 
     
District FE N Y Y Y 
Time dummies N Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N N Y N 
District-specific effects 
(unobservable  year) N N N Y 
Number of observations 2335 2335 2246 2335 
Number of districts 143    143     137     143 
Notes: OLS estimator. Sample period: 1920–1939. Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. 
Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are 
clustered at the district level. 
 
World Development  Papaioannou & de Haas 
57 
Table A-3. The impact of Lagged Imprisonment and Absolute Rainfall Deviation 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Imprisonment deviation GMM GMM GMM 







Absolute rainfall deviation 0.1926 0.2361 0.2073 
 
  [4.15]*** [2.79]*** [3.29]*** 
Absolute rainfall deviation, t - 1   -0.0089 
   [-0.04] 
Absolute rainfall deviation, t - 2   0.0472 
   [0.92] 
District FE Y Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N N N 
District-specific effects  (unobservable  year)           N                        
Y  
            Y 
Number of observations   2216 2216 1995 
Number of districts  143 137 143 
Number of instruments  169 309 168 
AR1 statistics (p-value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 statistics (p-value)  0.216 0.638 0.220 
Hansen test (p-value)  0.987 0.942 0.299 
Notes: System-GMM estimation for dynamic panel data-model. Sample period: 1920–1939. 
Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Second (and latter) lags were used as 
instruments in the first-differenced equations, and their once-lagged first differences were used in the 
levels equation. Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples using  
correction. We adjust standard errors for spatial dependency following Conley (1999). 
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Table A-4. The Impact of Limited and Exceptional Droughts & Excessive rainfall on Social Distress 
 
Dependent variable: Imprisonment deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Positive rainfall shock t  2 -0.0062     
 [-0.12]     
Negative rainfall shock t  2 0.0587     
 [-1.16]     
Positive rainfall shock t  1  0.0834    
  [1.63]    
Negative rainfall shock t  1  0.0170    
  [0.33]    
Positive  rainfall shock t   0.3354   
   [4.98]***   
Negative rainfall shock t   0.2595   
   [4.15]***   
Positive  rainfall shock t – 1    -0.0006  
    [-0.01]  
Negative rainfall shock t – 1    0.0560  
    [0.95]  
Positive  rainfall shock t - 2     -0.0210 
     [-0.37] 
Negative rainfall shock t - 2     0.0412 
     [0.72] 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N N N N N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  year) Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 2166 2286 2335 2211 2077 
Number of districts 143 143 143 143 143 
Notes: OLS estimator. Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the 
null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
Column (3) replicates the results in column 7 of Table 3. 
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Table A-5. Clustering Standard Errors at Different Levels 
 
Dependent variable: Imprisonment deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Rainfall Deviation Stations 0.2919 0.2744 0.2700   0.2509 
  (0.0437) (0.0408)  (0.0405)  (0.0391) 
  <0.0930> <0.0854> <0.0834> 
  [0.0905] [0.0825] [0.0759] 
     
Rainfall Deviation Grids 0.1632 0.1739  0.1636 0.1695  
  (0.0371)  (0.0355)  (0.0353) (0.0336) 
    <0.0865>  <0.0752>  <0.0725>  
    [0.0793]  [0.0716]  [0.0667]  
     
District FE N Y Y Y 
Time dummies N Y Y Y 
Observable controls x year  N  N Y N 
District-specific effects (unobservable x 
year) N N N Y 
Number of observations 2335 2680 2422 2680 
Notes. The specifications and the estimated coefficients in this Table are the same as in Table A-5. The standard 
errors in columns 2–4 are clustered at the district level (in parentheses),  the country level (in angle brackets) as 
well as two-way clustered both the country and the year level (in square brackets). 
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Table A-6. Alternative explanations 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 



















Absolute rainfall deviation 0.3393 0.3416 0.3178  0.3393 0.3416 0.3178  0.3173 0.3236 
  [7.21]*** [7.41]*** [7.22]***  [7.21]*** [7.41]*** [7.22]***  [6.66]*** [6.93]*** 
Export crop production  absolute rainfall 
deviation  
-0.2376 -0.2765 -0.2456  -0.2376 -0.2765 -0.2456  -0.2765 -0.2765 
[-2.80]*** [-3.26]*** [-3.02]***  [-2.80]*** [-3.26]*** [-3.02]***  [-3.26]*** [-3.26]*** 
Alternative explanation x absolute rainfall 
deviation 
-0.0002 0.0063 -0.0008  0.0151 0.0001 -0.0631  0.0061 -0.0156 
[-0.76] [0.18] [-1.00]  [1.34] [0.28] [-0.56]  [0.56] [-0.65] 
District FE Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y 
Observable controls x year Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y 
District-specific effects (unobservable x year)                  
Number of observations 2335 2246 2335  2335 2246 2335  2246 2335 
Number of districts 143 139 143  143 137 143  137 143 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 
percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
 




Appendix B. Export crop production calculation (for online Appendix) 
 
We proceed in the following steps: 
(i)  We obtain annual, crop-specific, country-level export crop export values, compiled in the 
Wageningen African Commodity Trade Database (henceforth WTD) (Frankema et al., 2015), for the 
years 1920 to 1939;  
(ii)  We collect annual, crop-specific, district-level, smallholder export crop production estimates for the 
years 1920 to 1939. We use a range of sources, including colonial maps, annual statistics and 
agricultural censuses. We inter-/extrapolate if production data is not available for all years. 
Whenever part of export crop production happens on expatriate farms, we deduct their share. The 
data is rough but suffices to estimate the shares of different districts in total country production. 
(iii) We use (ii) to distribute (i) over the individual districts, for each of the countries in our dataset.  
(iv) We add up the value of all smallholder grown export crops in a district to arrive at an indicator of 
annual, district-level export crop export values per district. 
(v)  We divide (iv) over annual, district-level population figures to arrive at an indicator of annual, 
district-level, smallholder export crop export value per capita. We inter-/extrapolate if  population 
data is not available for all years. 
(vi) We take the average of (v) for the years 1920-1939 to arrive our indicator of export crop production 
(average annual value of export crops in pounds per capita).  
A simple example is given below. We have followed a similar procedure for all the districts in our 
dataset. 
(i)  The total value of Nyasaland’s cotton production in the years 1920-1939, following the Wageningen 
African Trade Database, fluctuated between a minimum of £35 thousand in 1932 and a maximum of 
£205 thousand in 1935.  
(ii)  The colonial Bluebooks of Nyasaland report annual estimates of district-level native cotton 
production. The Lower Shire District’s contribution, according to these estimates, fluctuated between 
21 and 65 per cent of the country’s total cotton production between 1920 and 1939. 
(iii)  By multiplying the annual value (i) with the Lower Shire’s production share (ii), we find that the 
value of cotton produced in the Lower Shire district fluctuated between a minimum of £14 thousand 
and a maximum of £67 thousand.  
(iv)  The Lower Shire District only produces cotton so we can use the cotton figures, without having to 
add up values of different export crops. 
(v)  We deflate these annual district-level values with district-level population numbers to obtain an 
estimate of gross-export-crop-income per capita, which in the case of the Lower Shire varies 
between £0.2 (during the depression years), and £0.8 per capita.  
(vi)  Because both the district-level production estimates and population figures need to be treated as 
rough proxies of reality, we discard annual fluctuations and take the average of the entire 20-year 
period as our indicator for export crop intensity. The average gross annual per capital export income 
for the Lower Shire district is £0.4.  
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Gold Coast 
District borders are the administrative borders from 1930 reported in Gold Coast ‘Administration 
Report 1930’. District-level, smallholder production shares for cocoa, cola nuts, copra and palm oil are 
estimated using maps in Cardinall (1932) and Kaplan et al. (1971). No panel data on export crop 
production is used. The 1931 map-based production shares are used for the entire period (1920-1939). 
District-level, export crop production shares are obtained by dividing the district’s production estimates 
by the country-sum of production estimates. Annual, district-level smallholder export crop production 
values are obtained by multiplying the 1931 production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific 
exports from the WTD. All crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district population. 
Annual population figures are obtained from Gold Coast Blue Books (1920-1939). For some districts, 
only data for 1930 is available. Missing years are extrapolated using a nearby district. Note that the maps 
only indicate the area in which export crops were produced, and do not indicate the intensity of 
production or yields. Hence, the assigned shares are a rough approximation. 
Nigeria 
District level data for Nigeria is not available. Instead, we use provinces. Borders are obtained 
from Papaioannou (2016). Province-level, smallholder production shares for cocoa, cotton, groundnuts 
and palm oil are estimated using maps cited in Papaioannou (2016). No panel data on export crop 
production is used. The map-based production shares are used for the entire period (1920-1939). District-
level, export crop production shares are obtained by dividing the district’s production estimates by the 
country-sum of production estimates. Annual, district-level smallholder export crop production values are 
obtained by multiplying the map-based production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific exports 
from the WTD. All crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district population. Annual 
population figures are obtained from Nigeria Blue Books (1920-1939). Note that the maps only indicate 
the area in which export crops were produced, and do not indicate the intensity of production or yields. 
Hence, the assigned shares are a rough approximation. 
Sierra Leone 
District borders are administrative borders from 1920-30, reported  in Abraham (1978). District-
level, smallholder production shares for ginger and palm oil are estimated using production estimates for 
1938, reported on a map in Sierra Leone ‘Administration Reports’. No panel data on export crop 
production is used. The 1938 production shares are used for the entire period (1920-1939). District-level, 
export crop production shares are obtained by dividing the district’s production estimates by the country-
sum of production estimates. Annual, district-level smallholder export crop production values are 
obtained by multiplying the 1938 production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific exports from 
the WTD. All crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district population. Annual 
population figures are obtained from Sierra Leone Blue Books (1920-1939). Note that the districts in 
Sierra Leone shifted somewhat between the interwar period and today. The graphical representation on 
the map, hence, is not fully accurate.  
Gambia 
Gambia is treated as one district. Export crop production (groundnuts) in that district can be 
equated to the total annual export figure in the WTD. Population figures from Gambia Blue Books (1920-
1939). Note that considerable numbers of migrants (‘strange farmers’) came annually to the Gambia to 
produce groundnuts (Swindell, 1980). Since these migrants are not counted in the population figures, the 
export crop intensity may be biased slightly upwards.  
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Tanganyika 
District borders are the administrative borders from 1933 reported in Berry (1972). District-level, 
smallholder production estimates for coffee, copra, cotton, groundnuts, sesame and tobacco are obtained 
from the Tanganyika Blue Books (1926, 1927, 1929, 1930, 1932, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1938 and 1939). 
District-level, smallholder export crop production shares are obtained by dividing each district’s 
production estimates by the country-sum of district production estimates. Expatriate-cultivated coffee is 
excluded from these shares, and subtracted from the country-level export value before values are assigned 
to the districts. Production shares for missing years are interpolated. The shares for 1920-1925 are set 
equal to the average share of 1926 and 1927. Annual, district-level smallholder export crop production 
values are obtained by multiplying the annual production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific 
exports from the WTD. All crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district population. 
Annual population figures are obtained from Tanganyika Blue Books (1928, 1931, 1939). Missing years 
are inter-/extrapolated using the same procedure as for the production estimates. Note that some of the 
crops included (copra, groundnuts and sesame) were both consumed locally and exported. We are forced 
to assume that export/local consumption shares are equally divided over the producing districts. This 
assumption has only a minor effect on the eventual export crop intensity estimates. 
Zanzibar 
District borders coincide with Pemba Island and Zanzibar Island. District-level, smallholder 
production estimates for cloves and copra are obtained by estimating the relative contribution of the two 
Islands based on production figures in Zanzibar ‘Administration Reports’. District-level, export crop 
production shares are obtained by dividing the district’s production estimates by the country-sum of 
production estimates. As the country export data does not distinguish between smallholder- and 
expatriate-produced export crops, we roughly estimate expatriate-plantation clove production at 50% and 
copra production at 20% and subtract the share of crops produced by expatriate farmers from the country 
sum before assigning values to districts. Annual, district-level smallholder export crop production values 
are obtained by multiplying the annual production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific exports 
from the WTD. All crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district population. Annual 
population figures are obtained from Zanzibar Blue Books (1920-1939).  
Kenya 
District borders are from Kenya ‘Administration Reports 1931’. District-level, smallholder 
production estimates for cotton, wattle, sesame, groundnuts and coconuts are obtained from Kenya 
‘Agricultural Census 1930’. No panel data on export crop production is used. The 1930 production shares 
are used for the entire period (1920-1939). District-level, export crop production shares are obtained by 
dividing the district’s production estimates by the country-sum of production estimates. Expatriate-
cultivated maize and wattle is excluded from these shares, and subtracted from the country-level export 
value before values are assigned to the districts. Annual, district-level smallholder export crop production 
values are obtained by multiplying the 1930 production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific 
exports from the WTD. All crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district population. 
Annual population figures are obtained from Kenya Colony Blue Books (1927, 1929, 1934, 1938). 
Missing years are inter-/extrapolated using a procedure analogous to the production estimates under 
‘Tanganyika’. Note that the district-level production figures are based on sales rather than production. 
Note that some of the crops included (maize, sesame, groundnuts, coconuts) were both consumed locally 
and exported. We are forced to assume that exports are equally divided over the producing districts, but 
this assumption has only a minor effect on the eventual export crop intensity estimates. 
 
Uganda 
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District borders are from Uganda ‘Administration Reports 1948’, with some modifications based 
on Wrigley (1959). District-level, smallholder production estimates for coffee and cotton are obtained 
from the Uganda Blue Books (1920, 1923, 1926, 1929, 1932, 1935 and 1938). District-level, export crop 
production shares are obtained by dividing the district’s production estimates by the country-sum of 
production estimates. Expatriate-cultivated coffee is excluded from these shares, and subtracted from the 
country-level export value before values are assigned to the districts. Production shares for missing years 
are set equal to the closest available year. Annual, district-level smallholder export crop production values 
are obtained by multiplying the annual production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific exports 
from the Uganda Bluebooks (the WTD does not break down export data for Kenya and Uganda). All 
crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district population. Annual population figures 
are obtained from Uganda Blue Books (1920, 1923, 1926, 1929, 1932, 1935 and 1938). Missing years are 
inter-/extrapolated using the same procedure as for the production estimates. Note that the district shares, 
as well as the smallholder versus expatriate shares are based on acreage rather than production, meaning 
that yield differences between provinces is not taken into account. This may slightly diminish the 
accuracy of the export crop intensity estimates.  
Nyasaland 
District borders are from Nyasaland ‘Administration Reports 1933’. District-level, smallholder 
production estimates for cotton and tobacco are obtained from the Nyasaland Blue Books (1923, 1925, 
1927, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937 and 1939). District-level, export crop production shares are obtained 
by dividing the district’s production estimates by the country-sum of production estimates. As the country 
export data does not distinguish between smallholder- and expatriate-produced export crops, crops (both 
cotton and tobacco) produced by expatriate farmers are included into this country-sum. Production shares 
for missing years are inter-/extrapolated (analogous to procedure described under ‘Tanganyika’ above). 
Annual, district-level smallholder export crop production values are obtained by multiplying the annual 
production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific exports from the WTD. All crops are added up 
and the resulting total is divided by the district population. Annual population figures are obtained from 
Nyasaland Blue Books (1920-1938). Missing years are inter-/extrapolated using the same procedure as 
for the production estimates. Note that the district-level production figures are based on sales rather than 
production. The Blue Books explicitly note that this way of measuring diminishes the accuracy of 
production estimates, as ‘many natives grow their tobacco and cotton in one district and sell in another’.  
Bechuanaland 
Districts borders based on a map kindly provided by Ellen Hillbom. No smallholder export crops 
were exported from Bechuanaland. All districts are set at 0.  
Northern Rhodesia 
No map from the interwar period was available. Instead we used district borders based Northern 
Rhodesia ‘Administration Reports 1948’. No smallholder export crops were exported from Northern 
Rhodesia. All districts are set at 0.  
General notes 
Population figures are obtained from the Blue Books. These official population figures are 
generally considered to be much too low (see Frankema and Jerven (2014). However, we are still very far 
from revising these official colonial population figures on the district level. Hence, we consistently use 
the colonial figures, taking stock of the possibility that our per capita estimates are too high all across the 
board and that some inaccuracy may enter the dataset as some districts may have been more accurately 
counted than others.  
Country-level exports of each of the crops are obtained from Wageningen Trade Database 
(WTD). These figures are generally considered highly accurate and hence serve as the basis of our 
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estimates. However, we do not account for the possibility that a share of the export value did not accrue to 
others in the production chain.  
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